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Abstract 
 
While many economists suggest that a central bank should make positive profits from 
currency intervention to maintain price stability, profits and losses from currency 
intervention by the China’s central bank have not received any attention in the literature. My 
dissertation will use three chapters to fill in this gap. Chapter 1 investigates the optimal 
currency intervention policy for a profitability targeting central bank using a two-period 
framework. It is shown that when foreign interest rate is zero, the optimal policy is 
nonintervention. If the interest rate is positive, a country may earn positive profits by 
incurring a trade surplus in the first period. However, there is an upper bound for the 
currency depreciation rate. A country will lose money under excessive devaluation. Chapter 
2 further computes the specific annual and cumulative accounting profits and losses from 
1994 when China began its currency intervention. It is shown that China’s central bank 
initially made positive profits but since 2007 has lost a massive amount from the foreign 
exchange market. Chapter 3 investigates the optimal currency intervention policy for a 
welfare targeting government using a two period framework. It is shown that if marginal 
utility of income is decreasing in the exchange rate, then the optimal exchange rate are the 
equilibrium exchange rates that yields trade balance each period. 
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Chapter 1: Profits and Losses from Currency Intervention 
 
A paper accepted by International Review of Economics and Finance 
Hailong Jin and E. Kwan Choi 
 
1.1 ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates the possible gains from currency intervention by central banks 
using a two-period framework in which a trade surplus in one period must be offset by a 
trade deficit in the next period. It is shown that when the interest rate is zero, the optimal 
policy is nonintervention. If the interest rate is positive, a country may earn positive profits 
by incurring a trade surplus in the first period. However, there is an upper bound for optimal 
trade surplus. A country actually may lose money if the rate of devaluation below the 
equilibrium is greater than the interest rate. A linear model suggests that China may have 
been losing money from excessive devaluation of renminbi since 2002.  
1.2 INTRODUCTION 
Due to mounting currency reserves since the 1990s, China’s currency policy has been 
under intense scrutiny. People’s Bank of China (PBC) closed the currency swap market,1 and 
began to regulate renminbi on January 1, 1994 by moving the official rate to the then 
prevailing swap market rates (Goldstein and Lardy 2009, page 6). According to State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange of PBC, China’s foreign exchange reserve, which 
excludes gold, was $22 billion in 1993. China’s foreign exchange reserve has since increased 
steadily, reaching $166 billion in 2000. However, during the first decade of this century, 
                                                            
1 Goldstein and Lardy (2009, pp. 5-6) noted that before 1994, the swap market was sanctioned by the Chinese 
government to settle trade transactions. It helped the Chinese government find the equilibrium exchange rate. 
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China’s foreign exchange reserve rose dramatically to $3.3 trillion as of December 2011.2 
Such a meteoric rise in China’s cumulative trade surplus has provoked much debate 
concerning China’s currency valuation and misalignment. The common view is that “China 
has intentionally depressed the value of its currency, the renminbi (RMB), to gain unfair 
advantages in the global market.” (Cheung, 2011) 
Most major currencies are free floating vis-à-vis other currencies, except renminbi.3  
There might possibly be some gains or losses from currency intervention in the foreign 
exchange market. For example, Gylfason and Schmid (1983) show that devaluation has 
positive output effects in a study of ten countries. Thus, a Keynesian open economy may 
devaluate its currency during a recession in order to stimulate its economy. Currency 
devaluation raises a country’s trade surplus temporarily. However, any foreign currency 
reserve so accumulated must eventually be used up, and sold at different exchange rates. 
Ghosh (1997) argued that a sharp trader can make profits in currency trading by utilizing 
the forward contracts on foreign currency. In his model a speculator invests in a foreign 
currency for a given period and sells the anticipated sum in the forward market. Ghosh and 
Arize (2003) use the present value concept to compute profits of speculators who do not 
necessarily liquidate the existing balances. The speculator borrows money at the domestic 
interest rate and sells the anticipated proceeds in the forward currency market. 
Gains from currency speculation by the central bank have not received any attention in 
the literature.4 There are two main differences between speculation by private investors and 
                                                            
2 Of this amount, current account surplus was $2.2 trillion and the remaining $1.13 trillion was capital and 
financial flow. 
3 Prior to the Asian financial crisis of 1997, most Asian exchange rates were de facto pegged to the U.S. dollar. 
See Patnaik et al (2011). 
4 Hsiao, Pan and Wu (2012) observe that renminbi-euro rate is not an appropriate intervention object for China. 
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the PBC, China’s central bank. First, unlike private speculators, PBC simply prints yuan to 
buy foreign currencies, and hence does not pay interest. Second, no forward currency market 
for yuan exists due to its regulated status.5 PBC keeps track of the fund to purchase foreign 
currencies.  
The purpose of this paper is to investigate gains from currency intervention by a central 
bank. We utilize the profit concept from currency intervention (Ghosh, 1997). Since no 
forward renminbi market exists when it is regulated, we use the concept of anticipated profits 
from currency intervention in a two-period model. The primary intent of currency 
intervention may be to stimulate outputs and exports. Nevertheless, PBC may earn profits or 
incur losses from such intervention attempts. Thus, any benefits from expanded exports 
should be weighed against the possible losses from currency intervention.  
Section 1.2 considers the effects of yuan appreciation on China’s trade surplus. Section 
1.3 examines optimal trade surplus and the associated exchange rate in a two-period 
framework. Section 1.4 illustrates the main proposition for a linear model of exchange rate. 
Section 1.5 investigates a realistic upper bound for currency depreciation and the associated 
trade surplus share of GDP. Section 1.6 contains concluding remarks. 
1.3 EFFECTS OF YUAN APPRECIATION ON CHINA’S TRADE SURPLUS 
Assume that China is an open Keynesian economy and trades only with the United States. 
Due to price rigidity some unemployment exists in its domestic market, and changes in the 
exchange rate affect its gross domestic product (GDP). Let ε denote the dollar price of yuan 
and let ( / *, *)x P P Yε  denote China’s export in dollars, where P is the yuan price and P* the 
                                                            
5 Because of recent internationalization attempts, China is allowing the offshore market for the RMB 
denominated assets. 
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dollar price per unit of output, and Y* is GDP of the United States. China’s GDP, expressed 
in yuan, is given by: 
 ( )/ ,Y C I G X Qε= + + + −  
where Y, C, I, G and Q are China’s income, domestic consumption, investment, government 
spending and imports, all expressed in yuan. Assume that no financial flow occurs in the 
private sector.6 China’s imports in renminbi, ( / *, )q P P Yε , depends on the price level, 
exchange rate and its GDP. We normalize Chinese price so that *P P= , but China is free to 
choose its dollar peg ε.  
China’s net export S measured in dollars is defined as 
 ( , *) ( , ).iS X Y q Yε ε ε≡ −  (1) 
Since China is an open Keynesian economy, its GDP depends on its trade surplus in 
renminbi, ( / ).Y y S ε=  China’s income depends on the exchange rate. Let 
( ) ( , ( / ))Q q y Sε ε ε≡ be the reduced form of China’s import. China’s trade surplus in dollars 
( )S ε is defined by: 
 ( , *) ( ).S X Y Qε ε ε≡ −  (2) 
At the equilibrium exchange rate, oε , for balanced trade, ( ) ( , *) ( ) 0.o o o oS X Y Qε ε ε ε= − =  
We adopt a two-period framework to investigate the gains from currency intervention. 
While a country may have a trade surplus in one period, it must be used up subsequently 
because trade must be balanced in the long run. The U.S. economy is assumed to be 
                                                            
6 The financial flow was relatively insignificant until 2009, and accounts for roughly one third of China’s 
foreign exchange reserve as of 2011. 
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stationary, i.e., * *.iY Y=  Equation (1) implicitly defines the equilibrium exchange rate oiε  in 
each period; it is the exchange rate which insures zero trade surplus, *( , ) ( ) 0i i iX Y Qε ε ε− = .  
The exchange rate may also be expressed as a function of trade surplus,  
 ( , *).i ig S Yε =  (3) 
Since Y* is fixed, we may write the exchange rate as: 
 ( ),i if Sε =  (4) 
where trade surplus or deficit is expressed in dollars.  
Effect of Yuan Appreciation on Trade Surplus 
We now explore the effect of a yuan devaluation from the equilibrium rate on trade 
balance. Differentiating (2) with respect to ε and suppressing i gives: 
 ,S X Q Qε ε εε= − −  (5) 
where subscripts denote partial derivatives. Let ( )/ ( / )X X Xεη ε ε≡ ∂ ∂ and 
( )/ ( / )Q Q Qεη ε ε≡ − ∂ ∂  denote elasticity of exports and imports with respect to the exchange 
rate ε, respectively. Equation (5) can be rewritten as: 
 ( / ) ( / ) .X QS X Q Qε ε εη ε εη ε= + −  (6) 
As yuan appreciates, China’s trade surplus is assumed to decrease, i.e., 0.Sε <  When 
trade is balanced, ,X Qε=  and 
 1.X QS Xε ε ε
ε η η= + −  
Thus, China’s trade surplus in dollars decreases as yuan appreciates if, and only if 
 1.X Qε εη η+ <  (7) 
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We assume that the Marshall-Lerner condition holds. This implies 0Sε <  and '( ) 0f S < .  
Figure 1.1 illustrates that exchange rate ε  is decreasing in S. 
1.4 OPTIMAL TRADE SURPLUS 
Consider the base scenario in which China refrains from currency intervention and trade 
is balanced at the equilibrium exchange rate 0ε in both periods.  Without loss of generality, 
assume further that the equilibrium exchange rate is unity, 1.oε =  We now explore whether 
China can profit from currency intervention. For this purpose we relax the condition that 
trade must be balanced each period, but we allow a trade surplus in the first period. However, 
trade must be balanced over two periods. Thus, when China incurs a trade surplus in one 
period, it must have a trade deficit in the next period so that its trade is balanced over the two 
periods. 
Assume that China pegs yuan below the equilibrium rate in the first period, and it incurs 
a trade surplus 1 0S S= > . PBC buys dollar reserve with its renminbi, and hence does not 
incur any interest expense.7 The yuan cost of obtaining net export of S dollars is: 1/S ε . 
However, the value of China’s investment in dollar assets increases to (1 )S r+  dollars, where 
r is the interest rate on U.S. assets, e.g., Treasury bills.  
In the second period, China sells its foreign exchange reserve, (1 )S r+ . When this 
amount is sold in the second period, yuan revenue is ( )1 21 /S r ε+ , where ( )2 (1 )f S rε = − + is 
the exchange rate in the second period. Recall that yuan devaluation below the equilibrium 
rate in period 1, equal to unity, necessarily causes an appreciation of yuan above unity. 
                                                            
7 This constitutes an increase in money supply to affect the yuan-dollar exchange rate. PBC issues a certain 
amount of new money each year. Some of it is used to buy foreign exchange from commercial banks, and is 
called the “Funds outstanding for foreign exchange” by PBC. 
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We now explore whether China’s currency intervention is motivated by profits. The total 
profit in yuan realized in the second period from currency intervention is: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )2 1
1 1 1( )
(1 )
S r S rS S
f S r f S
π ε ε
⎛ ⎞+ += − = −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟− +⎝ ⎠
 (8) 
Consider the special case where the interest rate is zero. In this case, profit in (8) reduces 
to 
 1 1( ) .
( ) ( )
S S
f S f S
π ⎛ ⎞= −⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠  (9) 
If 0S = , then ( ) 0.Sπ =  This means that nonintervention in the foreign exchange market 
yields zero profit. If China chooses to have a trade surplus in the first period, then 1ε < and 
0S > .  
Since ( )f Sε =  is a decreasing function of S and S is positive in the first period, we have 
( ) (0) ( ),f S f f S− > >  or 2 11 ,ε ε> >  and   
1 1 0,   if 0.
( ) ( )
S
f S f S
− < >−  
Thus, ( ) 0Sπ < for all S > 0. Alternatively, if 0S < , then ( ) ( ) 0f S f S> − > , or 
1 21 ,ε ε> >  and 
1 1 0,    if 0.
( ) ( )
S
f S f S
− > <−  
Thus,  ( ) 0Sπ <  for all S < 0. Therefore, zero trade surplus is the global optimal solution 
to the profit maximization problem in (9). This result is summarized below: 
Proposition 1.  If 0r = , then the optimal trade surplus is zero. That is, neither a trade surplus 
nor a deficit in the first period is optimal. 
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Next, consider the general case where the interest rate is positive. Note that since the 
exchange rate cannot be zero, as depicted in Figure 1, ( )f Sε =  approaches the horizontal 
axis asymptotically as S increases. Differentiating (8) with respect to S gives 
 ( )
( )
( )
2
2 2
(1 ) ' (1 )1 1 '( )'( ) .
(1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( )
r f S rr f SS S
f S r f S f S r f S
π ⎛ ⎞+ − ++= − + +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟− + − +⎝ ⎠
 (10) 
Evaluating (10) at S = 0, we get 
 1 1'(0) 0.
(0) (0) (0)
r r r
f f f
π += − = = >  (11) 
This implies that profit is increasing in S when evaluated at 0S = . Since (0) 0π =  and 
marginal profit is increasing in S at S = 0 (i.e., '(0) 0π > ), the optimal profit must be 
positive, ( ) (0) 0.optSπ π> =  However, when 0S < , note that 2 1ε ε<  and 
 1 2 1 1
2 1 1 2 1 2
1 1 (1 ) (1 )( ) 0,r r rS S S Sε ε ε επ ε ε ε ε ε ε
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞+ + − + −= − = < <⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
 
Thus, ( ) 0Sπ <  for 0S < . Therefore, the globally optimal policy must be a trade surplus. 
Proposition 2. If 0r > , then an optimal policy is a trade surplus 0S > and the optimal 
exchange rate 1ε  in the first period is below unity, i.e., 1 1.ε <  
1.5 THE LIMITING SURPLUS SHARE MODEL 
We now consider a model that imposes limits to the trade surplus share. The reduced 
form exchange rate equation in (3) indicates that China’s trade depends on the exchange rate 
and U.S. GDP.  Let a be the upper physical limit of China’s trade surplus share of U.S. GDP. 
For instance, if .1a = , then China’s trade surplus can never exceed 10 percent of U.S. GDP.  
The yuan-dollar exchange rate function ( )f Sε =  takes a specific form:  
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 1 ,ii
s
a
ε = −  (12) 
where / *i is S Y=  is China’s trade surplus share of U.S. GDP. Profit from currency 
intervention is 
 
2 1
(1 ) .S r Sπ ε ε
+= −  (13) 
In the second period, China incurs a trade deficit, equal to 2 0.S <  Thus, profit is written 
as: 
 2 (1 )* .
( )( )
ar s rsaY
a s sr a s
π ⎛ ⎞− += ⎜ ⎟+ + −⎝ ⎠  (14) 
Recall that .s a<  If r = 0, then  
 
2
2 2
2 2 ** 0
( )( )
s s aYsaY
a s a s a s
π ⎛ ⎞− −= = ≤⎜ ⎟+ − −⎝ ⎠  (15) 
which is nonpositive. Thus, if r = 0, nonintervention is optimal as indicated by Proposition 2. 
Next, assume r > 0. If 0s = , then π = 0, and if 0
2(1 )
ars
r
< < + , then ( ) 0.sπ >  Thus, a 
small trade surplus can yield positive profit, as indicated by Proposition 2. 
In Figure 1.2, profit on the vertical axis is expressed as a function of S on the horizontal 
axis. To determine an appropriate value of a in equation (12), we choose the year with trade 
balance. In 1995, China’s trade surplus was the lowest ($1.6 billion) and hence China should 
be deemed to have achieved trade balance. Also, China’s GDP was 9.9 percent of U.S. GDP 
that year.   
Given Y* = $10 trillion, optimal trade surplus is approximately $10 billion, and the 
intervention profit is about .29 billion yuan, which amounts to about $.29 billion when 
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evaluated at the equilibrium exchange rate. Note that the optimal trade surplus of $10 billion 
is roughly 0.1 percent of U.S. GDP. 
1.6 PRACTICAL LIMITS TO DEVALUATION 
How high is the optimal trade surplus? Recall that the market clearing yuan-dollar 
exchange rate in each period is assumed to be unity, i.e., 1.oε =   From Proposition 2, we 
know optimal trade surplus S in the first period is positive. Recall that ( ) 0Sπ = at S = 0, and 
profit is increasing in S at S = 0 ( '(0) 0π > ). Thus, an optimal trade surplus 1S  and profit 
1( )Sπ in the first period are both positive. From the profit function in (8), profit for the 
optimal level of trade surplus S is positive, i.e., 
 ( )1 1 1 1
1 1( ) (0) 0.
(1 ) ( )
rS S
f S r f S
π π⎛ ⎞+= − > =⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟− +⎝ ⎠
 (16) 
Let ( )1 1
1 1( )
(1 ) ( )
rA S
f S r f S
+≡ −− + denote per unit or average profit of holding a trade 
surplus in the first period. Since S1 > 0, this implies unit profit is positive, i.e., 
 ( )( )1 11 1
(1 ) ( ) (1 )
( ) 0.
(1 ) ( )
r f S f S r
A S
f S r f S
+ − − += >− +  (17) 
Thus,  
 ( )1 1(1 ) ( ) (1 ) (0),r f S f S r f+ > − + >  (18) 
since ( )f S  is a decreasing function of S. Thus,  1(1 ) ( ) (0).r f S f+ >   
Since (0) 1o fε = = by assumption, we get 
 1
1 .
1 r
ε > +  (19) 
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That is, the optimal exchange rate in the first period is less than unity by Proposition 2, 
but (19) implies that there is a lower bound for the optimal exchange rate.8   
Proposition 3. If 0r > , then the optimal exchange rate has a lower bound, 
1
1 ,
1
opt
r
ε > + which is independent of trade surplus. 
 
Note that 2
1 1 1 .
1 1
r r
r r
−= > −+ −  Let ε represent δ percent depreciation from the 
equilibrium exchange rate, ε = 1, i.e., 1 .ε δ= −  Then 11 ,
1 r
δ− > +  or 
 .
1
rr
r
δ> >+  (20) 
Thus, the optimal exchange rate must be greater than (1 )r− . Note that if the devaluation 
rate below the equilibrium were equal to the interest rate, profit is already negative, i.e., if 
r δ= , 1( ) 0.Sπ <  Thus, for example, if the interest rate is 5 percent, the optimal depreciation 
rate is below 5 percent, and 1 0.95.
optε >  That is, the exchange rate should be devalued no 
more than 5 percent from the equilibrium value. 
We now consider a practical upper bound for trade surplus. In the linear model, from (18), 
we get 1(1 ) 1.r ε+ >  Since 1 11 rε > +  and ,1
rr
r
> + we have 
 1 1.r ε+ >  (21) 
                                                            
8 Note that in Figure 1, the exchange rate is a decreasing function of S, and an optimal trade  
surplus is positive, so we have 1(0) ( )f f S> . Thus, ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]1 11 0 (1 ) ( ) 1 .r f r f S f S r+ > + > − +   Thus, (18) 
implies ( ) 21 1,or ε+ > > where 02ε  is the exchange rate in the second period resulting from the optimal 
exchange rate in the first period. 
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In the limiting surplus share model, from (12) we get 1 1/ 1 .s a ε= −  Thus, (21) reduces to 
11 / 1r s a+ − > , or 
 1 .s ar<  (22) 
This means that when a conservative limit .1a =  is chosen, China’s surplus share of U.S. 
GDP must be below one-tenth of the interest rate on U.S. Treasury bills.  
Figure 1.3 shows that China’s trade surplus share of U.S. GDP has been below the 
interest rate on U.S. Treasury bills until 2002. China’s trade surplus share of U.S. GDP 
followed roughly the optimal path of (10 percent of) the interest rates on U.S. Treasury bills 
until 2002, but have since diverged greatly. In 2008, an upper limit of China’s trade surplus 
share of U.S. GDP should have been about 0.16 percent, but China’s actual trade surplus 
share rose to 2.88 percent, and the actual trade surplus amounted to $412 billion dollars in 
2008, and U.S. GDP was $14.30 trillion. These mounting trade surpluses clearly are outside 
the profitable range, suggesting that China’s currency policy is not motivated by profit 
considerations. 
Since China’s economy has been steadily growing, a more liberal limit of a =  40 percent 
might be chosen. China’s trade surplus share has been less than .4ar r= until 2006, but has 
since exceeded even this liberal limit.   
1.7 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
We have explored the gains from currency intervention for a small, open Keynesian 
economy. In a two-period framework, if a country incurs a trade surplus, it is invested in the 
US treasury bills earning some interest income. Such foreign assets eventually must be used 
up in the subsequent period at a different exchange rate. Thus, there exists the possibility for 
China either to make profits or incur losses. 
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We have shown that if the interest rate is zero, the optimal trade surplus is zero. If the 
interest rate is positive, then a small country can make profits from devaluing its currency 
below the equilibrium rate in the first period. In this case, the associated optimal trade 
surplus is positive. However, there is a lower bound for the optimal exchange rate, and hence 
an upper bound for a trade surplus. If the interest rate is 5 percent, then the optimal exchange 
rate requires a devaluation of not more than 5 percent from the equilibrium exchange rate for 
balanced trade.  
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Figure 1.1: Exchange Rate and Trade Surplus 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Profit and Trade Surplus ( 0.05r = ) 
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Figure 1.3: China’s Trade Surplus Share of U.S. GDP and Interest Rate 
Source: World Development Indicators online Database, World Bank, and Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
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Chapter 2: China’s Profits and Losses from Currency Intervention, 1994-
2011 
 
Hailong Jin and E. Kwan Choi 
 
2.1 ABSTRACT 
China’s currency policy has been criticized for its apparent pursuit of mercantile 
advantage by artificially stimulating exports, which potentially have adverse effects on other 
economies. While China’s currency policy may have positive output effects, there may be 
additional profits or losses. This paper computes the annual and cumulative accounting 
profits from currency intervention since 1994 when China began its currency intervention. It 
is shown that profits initially were positive but China since 2007 has lost a massive amount 
from the currency market. 
2.2 INTRODUCTION 
Due to China’s mounting currency reserves since the 1990s, its currency policy has been 
under intense scrutiny. This meteoric rise in China’s cumulative trade surplus has provoked 
much debate concerning China’s currency valuation and misalignment. The common view is 
that “China has intentionally depressed the value of its currency, the renminbi (RMB), to 
gain unfair advantages in the global market.” (Cheung, 2012; McKinnon and Schnabl, 2004) 
China’s currency policy has been criticized because of its possible adverse consequences on 
other economies. 
Most major currencies are free-floating vis-à-vis other currencies, except the renminbi.  
China’s low renminbi policy may stimulate its economy and reduce unemployment. For 
example, Gylfason and Schmid (1983) showed that devaluation has positive output effects in 
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a study of ten countries. While currency devaluation raises a country’s trade surplus 
temporarily, reserves cannot grow indefinitely in a stationary equilibrium. Since reserves are 
bought and sold at different exchange rates. Hence, the central bank may suffer losses from 
such intervention. 
Many monetarists suggest that a central bank should make positive profits from currency 
intervention to maintain price stability (e.g., Friedman, 1953). They argue that “the central 
bank has an information advantage over other market participants; it also intervenes to 
straighten out destabilizing behavior such as ‘disorderly markets’” (Sweeney, 1997, pp. 1668, 
Taylor, 2005).” Although few governments admit currency intervention is motivated by 
profitability, but it is used as a measure of success. For instance, Leahy (1995) and Fatum 
and Hutchison (2006) analyzed profits of currency intervention by the US and Japan, 
respectively. However, profits and losses from currency intervention by the China’s central 
bank have not received any attention in the literature.  
There are two main differences between speculation by private investors and the People’s 
Bank of China (PBC), China’s central bank. First, unlike private speculators, PBC simply 
prints yuan to buy foreign currencies, and hence does not pay interest. Second, no deliverable 
forward currency market for yuan exists due to its regulated status.9 PBC keeps track of the 
fund to purchase foreign currencies.  
The purpose of this paper is to investigate China’s profits and losses from currency 
intervention since 1994 when China began to merge the exchange rates in the swap market 
and official exchange rates. McKinnon and Schnabl (2009) note that renminbi was 
                                                            
9 Because of recent internationalization attempts, China is allowing the offshore market for the RMB-
denominated assets. Also, nondeliverable forwards (NDFs) exist in yuan. However, not all non-convertible 
currencies have a NDF market, which exists in some countries where forward foreign exchange trading is 
banned by the government. 
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inconvertible before 1994. Also, China’s trade surplus was negligible in 1994. Thus, we 
choose 1994 as the base year to compute annual and cumulative profits from currency 
intervention. Since the central bank may retain any amounts of foreign exchange reserve in 
any period, we utilize the accounting profit concept from currency intervention in a multi-
period framework (Ghosh, 1997; Ghosh and Arize, 2003). We demonstrate that while profits 
from currency intervention were positive in the 1990s, China has lost a phenomenal sum 
since 2007. 
2.3 EFFECTS OF YUAN APPRECIATION ON CHINA’S TRADE SURPLUS 
Assume that China is an open Keynesian economy in each period and trades only with 
the United States. Due to price rigidity some unemployment exists in its domestic market, 
and changes in the exchange rate affect its gross domestic product (GDP). Let ε denote the 
dollar price of yuan and let ( , , *)x P Yε  denote China’s export in dollars, where P is the price 
level expressed as yuan per unit of output, and Y* is GDP of the United States. China’s GDP, 
expressed in yuan, is given by: 
 ( )/ ,i i i i i i iY C I G x qε= + + + −  
where Y, C, I, G and q are China’s income, domestic consumption, investment, government 
spending and imports, all expressed in yuan. China’s import, ( , , )q P Yε , depends on the price 
level, exchange rate and its GDP.  
China is free to choose its dollar peg ε. China’s net export Si is defined as 
 *( , , ) ( , , ),i i i i i i i iS x P Y q P Yε ε ε≡ −  (23) 
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where  * /i i iP Pε = is the dollar price of yuan, *P is the dollar price per unit of output in the 
United States, and iY  and 
*
iY  are China’s GDP measured in yuan and U.S. GDP measured in 
dollars in period i, respectively. China’s trade surplus S is measured in dollars.  
Since China is an open Keynesian economy, a yuan devaluation immediately affects 
domestic price, * /i i iP P ε= . However, yuan depreciation does not affect U.S. GDP, i.e., 
* *
iY Y= . Substituting * /i i iP Pε =  into (1), we get 
 * * * * *( / , , ) ( / , , ) ( , , *) ( , , ).i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i iS x P Y q P Y X P Y Q P Yε ε ε ε ε ε ε ε≡ − = −  
Since foreign price is fixed, * *iP P= , and P* will be suppressed henceforth. Let 
( , )F d r be capital or financial inflow in dollars, including direct investment, portfolio 
investment and short-term capital flow, excluding reserve account activities, where d and r 
are domestic and foreign interest rate, respectively. A balance of payments (BP) surplus is 
written as 
 ( , *) ( , ) .i i i i i i iS F X Y Q Y Fε ε ε+ = − +  (24) 
We first consider the gains from currency intervention in a two-period framework. In a 
stationary equilibrium reserves cannot grow indefinitely. Thus, we assume a balance of 
payments surplus in one period is offset by a deficit in the next period. Trade surplus arising 
from any currency intervention directly affects aggregate expenditure.  
 Equation (1) implicitly defines the equilibrium exchange rate oiε  in each period; it is the 
exchange rate which insures zero balance of payments 
surplus, *( , ) ( , ) ( , ) 0i i i i i iX Y Q Y F d rε ε ε− + = .  
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Note that Yi depends on Si and εi, i.e., ( , , *).i i i iY Y S Yε=  Equation (24) implicitly defines 
the exchange rate as a function of trade surplus and U.S. GDP. Thus, the exchange rate also 
may be expressed as a function of balance of payments surplus,  
 ( , *).i i ig S F Yε = +  (25) 
A change in foreign income Y* shifts the trade surplus function. Since Y* is assumed as 
fixed, we may write the exchange rate as: 
 ( ),i i if S Fε = +  (26) 
where a trade surplus or deficit is expressed in dollars.  
We now explore the effect of a yuan devaluation from the equilibrium rate on the trade 
balance. Note that a change in the exchange rate affects its imports, which in turn affects 
China’s GDP, and hence we may write ( )( ),i i i i iY Y S ε ε≡ . The reduced form of China’s 
import may be written as ( )( ) , ( ) .i i i iQ Q Yε ε ε≡  Differentiating (24) with respect to ε and 
suppressing i gives: 
 ,S X Q Qε ε εε= − −  (27) 
where subscripts denote partial derivatives. Given that the Marshall-Lerner condition holds,10 
the trade surplus function is negatively sloped, as shown in Figure 2.1. This implies 0Sε <  
and '( ) 0f S < .  
In the absence of financial flows, the equilibrium exchange rate is attained where the 
trade surplus function S intersects the vertical line at S = 0. Recall that ( , )F d r  is capital 
                                                            
10 China’s trade surplus in dollars decreases as yuan appreciates if 1,X Qε εη η+ < where 
( )/ ( / )X X Xεη ε ε≡ ∂ ∂ and ( )/ ( / )Q Q Qεη ε ε≡ − ∂ ∂  denote elasticity of exports and imports with respect to 
the exchange rate ε. It can be shown that China’s trade surplus in yuan also decreases under the same condition. 
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inflow. If net capital inflow is positive, it shifts the balance of payments curve, S F+ , to the 
right, as shown in Figure 2.1.  
2.4 ANNUAL PROFITS FROM CURRENCY INTERVENTION 
If China behaves as a price taker in the currency market, an equilibrium exchange rate is 
that which clears the foreign currency market. If China pegs renminbi at a different rate, a BP 
surplus or deficit occurs. For instance, China may choose to devalue yuan below the 
equilibrium and invest the resulting BP surplus in the United States. Nevertheless, reserves 
cannot grow indefinitely in a stationary equilibrium. To consider the benefits of foreign 
investment by currency intervention in a simple model, first consider a two period model. 
China is assumed to incur a trade surplus in the first period, which is invested in dollar assets 
in the United States, and the proceeds are used in the second period. Subsequently, this 
assumption is relaxed for multi-period analyses. 
Let 1S S=  denote China’s trade surplus in the first period. The yuan cost of a trade 
surplus of S dollars is 1/S ε , where ε1 is the exchange rate in the first period. Trade surplus of 
1S  dollars is invested in US Treasury bills, which grows to 1(1 )S r+  at the end of the second 
period, where r is the interest rate on the Treasury bills. The yuan cost of net direct 
investment is 1/F ε , which is invested in U.S. Treasury bills. We assume that any foreign 
investment, whether it is portfolio investment or direct investment, is repatriated in the 
second period. Thus, the total amount, ( )(1 )S F r+ + , is sold in the foreign exchange market 
in the second period, and the revenue in renminbi is ( ) 2( ) 1 /S F r ε+ + , 
where ( )2 ( )(1 )f S F rε = − + + is the exchange rate in the second period.  
The total profit realized from currency intervention is: 
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( )2 1
( )(1 ) 1 1( ) ( ) .
( )(1 ) ( )
S F r S F rS F S F
f S F r f S F
π ε ε
⎛ ⎞+ + + ++ = − = + −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟− + + +⎝ ⎠
 (28) 
In order to consider the benefits from currency intervention for more than two periods, 
we now relax the assumption that the central bank liquidates its currency reserve in any 
period. That is, the central bank may sell some of its reserve, or buy even more. If any 
amount of foreign exchange is retained, it is treated as foreign investment at the current 
pegged rate. Such action, short of liquidation, may contribute to profits or losses in 
subsequent periods.  
Annual Accounting Profits 
Let iC  denote the amount of cumulative foreign currency invested in the U.S. Treasury 
bills in period i. Assume that the stock of foreign currency reserve at the beginning of period 
1 is zero ( 0 0C = ), and hence 1 1 1.C S F= +  The yuan cost of purchasing C1 dollars is 1 1/ .C ε  
Foreign investment of 1C  dollars increases to 1 1(1 ),C r+  where ir  is the US interest rate in 
period i. Thus, the accounting profit in the first period, which is to be known in the second 
period, is written as: 
 1 1 11 1 1 1 2
2 1 2 1
( )(1 ) (1 )( , , , ) .S F r C r CS FC rπ ε ε ε ε ε ε
+ + ++= − = −  (29) 
Thus, 1 1 1 2( , , , )S rπ ε ε is the accounting profit in period 1 obtained by assessing the end-of-
period currency reserve, 1(1 ) ( )(1 ),C r S F r+ = + +  at the unknown exchange rate in the 
second period, ε2. If the central bank liquidates the reserve in the next period, ε2 can be 
observed from the trade surplus function. However, the central bank may choose to sell only 
a part of its reserve or buy even more. We assume that the central bank pegs renminbi each 
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period, and it does not know at what exchange rate renminibi will be pegged thereafter. Thus, 
in each period, the subsequent exchange rates will be treated as unknown variables.  
In the second period, the cumulative investment in the U.S. Treasury bills is 
2 1 1 2 2(1 )C C r S F= + + + , where S2 and F2 are the additional purchases of dollar assets and 
foreign direct investment in period 2, both of which can be negative. Since the central bank 
holds 2C  in period 2, its yuan cost is 2 2/ .C ε  The cumulative foreign investment 2C  grows to 
2 2(1 )C r+  at the end of the second period, which is to be evaluated at the unknown exchange 
rate, ε3. The market value of the current reserve at the end of period 2 is 
 2 2
3
(1 ) .C rε
+  
Thus, the accounting profit in the second period is: 
 2 2 22 2 2 2 3
3 2
(1 )( , , , ) .C r CC rπ ε ε ε ε
+= −  (30) 
Similarly, the annual profit in period N is 
 ( ) 11
1
(1 ), , , .N N NN N N N N N
N N
rC r C ε επ ε ε ε ε
+
+
+
⎛ ⎞+ −= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 (31) 
It is important to note that if renminbi appreciates too much, the annual profit will be 
negative. Only if 1(1 ) N Nr ε ε ++ > , the annual profit will be positive. If renminbi appreciates 
faster than the interest rate, then the annual profit will be negative. 
Properties of Annual Accounting Profits 
From (31), annual accounting profits depend on ,Nε 1Nε +  and Nr . Differentiating (31) 
with respect to Nr  yields 
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 2
1 1
11 1 1 .N N N NN
N N N N N N N
F rC
r r r
π ε
ε ε ε ε+ +
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞∂ ∂ ∂ += + + −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟∂ ∂ ∂⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
  (32) 
Provided that 0,NC > the first term is positive. For the second term, if iε  satisfies the 
fundamental martingale property, i.e., ( )1 1| , , ,N N NE ε ε ε ε+ ="  then by Jensen’s inequality, 
1
1 1 ,N
N N
E ε ε+
⎛ ⎞ ≥⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
and hence 
1
1 1 0.N NN
N N N
r rE ε ε ε+
⎛ ⎞+ − ≥ >⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 Since 0,N
N
F
r
∂ <∂ the second term on 
the RHS is positive on average. The sign on the RHS is indeterminate.  
Differentiating (31) with respect to Nε  and 1Nε + , we get 
 1 2
1
(1 ) 0,
( )
N N N N N N
N N N N N
S r Cπ ε ε
ε ε ε ε ε
+
+
∂ ∂ + −= + >∂ ∂   (33) 
 2
1 1
(1 ) 0.
( )
N N N
N N
C rπ
ε ε+ +
∂ += − <∂  (34) 
Thus, as yuan appreciates, other things equal, expected annual profit increases. On the 
other hand, as the future value of yuan rises, current profit declines, because a given amount 
of dollar assets fetches a smaller sum in yuan.  
The elasticity of annual profit with respect to the future exchange rate is: 
 
1
1
1 1
(1 ) .
(1 )N
N N N N
N N N N N
r
rπε
ε π εη π ε ε ε+
+
+ +
∂ +≡ = −∂ + −  (35) 
Suppose the interest rate were .1 percent (as in 2011) and yuan were undervalued by 10 
percent. Then a 1 percent yuan appreciation (from ε =.9 to .91) reduces profits by  
 .9 1.001 99.
1.001 .9 .91
η ×= − =× −  
Suppose the interest rate is 5 percent and yuan was undervalued by 25 percent. In this 
situation, a 1 percent yuan appreciation (from ε = .9 to .91) reduces profit by 27 percent.  
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These examples suggest that annual profits from currency intervention are very sensitive to 
exchange rate appreciation, especially when the interest rate is near zero.   
Data 
China’s foreign exchange reserve and current account data were obtained from the State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange.11 The 1994-2011 yuan-dollar exchange rate data are 
obtained from the World Development Indicators database. To calculate the annual and 
cumulative profits in 2011, the yuan-dollar exchange rate on July 2, 2012 was used as proxy 
for the unknown average exchange rate 2012. Interest rates on U.S. Treasury bills change 
daily, and the currency reserve data are only annual figures. Thus, a sort of annual average 
interest rates is needed to compute annual profits from currency intervention. Six-month 
interest rates on U.S. Treasury bills were used as the annual interest rates.12  
Annual Accounting Profits Financial Flow 
Based on Equation (9), we calculated China’s annual profits from currency intervention 
for the period, 1994-2011. The results are listed in Table 2.1. Goldstein and Lardy (2009) 
noted that before 1985, the swap market was sanctioned by the Chinese government to settle 
trade transactions. They argue that the official yuan-dollar rate was above the equilibrium 
market exchange rate, and was used for intergovernmental transactions. Nevertheless, the 
swap market was helpful to the Chinese government for settling trade transactions at the 
equilibrium exchange rate. They argued that “the official exchange rate during mid-1990s 
was probably a reasonable approximation of an equilibrium rate (pp. 6).”  
                                                            
11 This data excludes gold from the international reserve assets. 
12 Interest rate data on the 1-year Treasury bills were not available in certain years. 
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Also, the method of computing the foreign exchange reserve was changed in 1992 to 
exclude foreign exchange deposits of state-owned entities with Bank of China. Thus, it 
would be necessary to choose a base year after 1992. The current account surplus was only 
about $5 billion in 1992, and the current account deficit was about $12 billion in 1993. Few 
economists argue that China’s intervention started before 1993. Thus, the period 1993-1994 
may be the time in which China refrained from currency intervention. Accordingly, profits 
and losses from subsequent attempts to moderate exchange rate changes can be computed 
from 1994.  
Table 2.1 shows annual profits in yuan from currency intervention, which rose to 81 
billion yuan in 2000, equal to approximately 1/10 of 1 percent of U.S. GDP, but fell to zero 
in 2006. Since 2006, China began to incur huge losses, which rose to 546 billion yuan in 
2007, 843 billion yuan ($125 billion) in 2010, and 447 billion yuan ($69 billion) in 2011. 
This amount should be compared to the actual current account surplus of $202 billion in 
2011. 
Annual Accounting Profits without Financial Flow 
Financial flows are made to take advantage of different interest rates between countries. 
The presence of the financial flows indicates that there are temporary differences in the 
financial returns or profitability of investment between the two economies. If no financial 
flow occurs, i.e., 0iF = , for all i = 1, …, N, then equation (31) reduces to: 
 ( ) 11
1
(1 ), , , .S S N N NN N N N N N
N N
rC r C ε επ ε ε ε ε
+
+
+
⎛ ⎞+ −= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 (36) 
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where SNC  denotes China’s FX caused by trade surplus and is estimated by: 
1 1(1 ) ,
S
N N N NC C r S− −= + +  given C1993 = 0. 
Table 2.2 shows that the annual accounting profits without the financial flow also were 
near zero in 2006, and have since decreased to: -641 billion yuan in 2010. This is somewhat 
less than -843 billion yuan when the financial flow is included. As expected, if the interest 
rate differential is negligible, accounting profits should be roughly equal, whether financial 
flows are included or not. 
2.5 CUMULATIVE PROFITS FROM CURRENCY INTERVENTION 
In each period, the currency reserve is evaluated at the official exchange rate. Thus, the 
yuan value of the cumulative foreign exchange reserve in period 2 is 
2 1 1 2 2
2 2
(1 ) .C C r S Fε ε
+ + +=  Note that if China were to liquidate its currency reserve, then 
2 2 ( )(1 )S F S F r+ = − + + and the cumulative currency reserve at the end of period 2 reduces 
to 2 0.C =  The total yuan cost of the cumulative foreign exchange reserve in period 2 is: 
2 2 1 1
2
2 1
S F S FT ε ε
+ += + . 
PBC, as China’s central bank, does not pay interest. Unlike private speculators, PBC 
simply prints yuan to buy foreign currencies.13 No deliverable forward currency market for 
yuan exists due to its regulated status.  
Since China holds on to some currency reserve and does not necessarily liquidate it each 
period, we may consider the cumulative accounting profit which is obtained by assessing the 
                                                            
13 This constitutes an increase in money supply to affect the yuan-dollar exchange rate. PBC issues a certain 
amount of new money each year. Some of it is used to buy foreign exchange from commercial banks, and is 
called the “Funds outstanding for foreign exchange” by PBC. 
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value of currency reserves at the current pegged rate each period. The currency reserve is 
treated as the bank’s investment in dollar assets made during the current period, and should 
be separated from current profits. 
Cumulative Accounting Profit to be realized in period 2 is defined as: 
 2 2 2 2 1 12
3 2 1
(1 ) .C r S F S Fε ε ε
⎛ ⎞+ + +Π = − +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 (37) 
Note however, that the exchange rate ε2 depends on C2, and liquidation of the foreign 
exchange reserve will lower ε2 below the rate that would prevail if it is retained.  If the 
country liquidates its foreign exchange reserve in the second period, 
then 2 2 1 1( )(1 )S F S F r+ = − + +  and 2 0C = , and equation (37) reduces to (8), and the 
accounting profit reduces to the actual or realized profit, 
 1 1 1 1 11
2 1
( )(1 ) .S F r S Fε ε
+ + +Π = −  (38) 
Market Value of Foreign Exchange Reserve 
If the country does not liquidate the existing foreign exchange reserve in period 2, its 
cumulative reserve balance is 
 2 1 1 2 2(1 ) ,C C r S F= + + +  
and the value of the cumulative foreign exchange reserve in yuan at the end of period 2 
grows to 2 2 3(1 ) / .C r ε+  Note that cumulative investment of 3C  dollars grows to 3 3(1 ),C r+  
and its market value is: 3 3
4
(1 ) ,C rε
+ which is known in period 4. Likewise, the total yuan 
revenue that would be obtained from liquidating the cumulative foreign exchange reserve at 
the terminal period N is:  
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1
(1 ) .N N
N
C r
ε +
+  (39) 
Cumulative Accounting Profits  
The cumulative yuan cost of foreign exchange reserve in period 3 is: 
3
3
1
.i i
i i
S FF ε=
+=∑  
Thus, the cumulative accounting profit in yuan is: 
 3 3 3 3 2 2 1 13
4 3 2 1
(1 ) .C r S F S F S Fε ε ε ε
⎛ ⎞+ + + +Π = − + +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 (40) 
Likewise, the total yuan cost up to the terminal period N is:  
 
1
.
N
i i
N
i i
S FF ε=
+=∑  (41) 
Cumulative accounting profit in period N is the market value of the currency reserve less 
cost, i.e., 
 
11
(1 ) .
N
N N i i
N
iN i
C r S F
ε ε=+
+ +Π = −∑  (42) 
Note that the cumulative foreign exchange reserve in any period can be obtained by 
adding the new trade surplus to the cumulative reserve at the end of the previous period. 
However, in practice, the reported cumulative reserves generally deviate from these derived 
cumulative reserves.  
We now consider an alternative method to compute the cumulative accounting profit, 
which is obtained by adding annual accounting profits. Note that 2 1 1 2 2(1 )C C r S F= + + + . 
Thus, 2 2 2 1 1(1 ).S F C C r+ = − +  Likewise,  1 1(1 ),N N N N NS F C C r− −+ = − +  N > 1, and 
1 1 1.S F C+ =  Thus, we have 
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11
1 1 1 2 2 2
2 1 3 2
1
(1 )
(1 ) (1 )
.
N
N N i i
N
iN i
N
i
i
C r S F
C r C C r C
ε ε
ε ε ε ε
π
=+
=
+ +Π = −
+ += − + − +
=
∑
∑
"  
That is, the cumulative accounting profit in each period can be obtained by adding up the 
annual accounting profits. This method is used in Table 3 to compute the cumulative 
accounting profits.  
Differentiating (42) with respect to εN gives 
 
1 1 1 1
2 2
1
1
2
1
(1 ) (1 )
( ) ( )
(1 ) 0.
( )
N N N N N N N N N N
N N N N N N N N
N N N N N N
N N N N
S r C C r
S r S F
π π ε ε
ε ε ε ε ε ε ε ε
ε ε
ε ε ε ε
− + − −
+
+
+
∂Π ∂ ∂ ∂ + − += + = + −∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
∂ + − += + >∂
 (43) 
and from  (11) and (12), we also have 
1 1
0.N N
N N
π
ε ε+ +
∂Π ∂= <∂ ∂  
Table 2.3 displays the cumulative accounting profits since 1994. It shows that in the early 
years of currency intervention, cumulative profits in yuan from currency intervention steadily 
increased, reaching 543 billion yuan in 2006. PBC began to lose money in 2007 when its 
cumulative profit was completely wiped out. It has since found it difficult to recover from the 
mounting losses, which reached 1,399 billion yuan (or about $217 billion) in 2011, and are 
expected to rise further as the yuan appreciates. In 2011, the cumulative accounting loss rose 
to 1,128 billion yuan, or close to $179 billion without the financial flow. Again, inclusion of 
the financial flow does not make much difference in the cumulative accounting profits. 
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2.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The primary intent of currency intervention may be to stimulate outputs and exports. 
Nevertheless, PBC may earn profits or incur losses from such intervention attempts. Thus, 
any benefits from expanded exports should be weighed against the possible losses from 
currency intervention.  
Throughout the 1990s, China’s profits from currency markets were negligible and China 
did not intentionally speculate in the currency market. In 1994, China merged the official and 
swap markets, effectively adopting the exchange rates from the swap market. Initially, the 
exchange rate rose to the equilibrium level. However, after 1994, the currency peg apparently 
was below the equilibrium level and China began to accumulate trade surpluses. Such 
intervention yielded profits until 2006, but the continued appreciation of the yuan resulted in 
the ballooning of the cumulative losses. This result does not change whether or not the 
financial flow is included. 
The cumulative profits of about 543 billion yuan in 2006 were wiped out completely the 
next year, and the mounting losses from currency intervention rose to 1,399 billion yuan in 
2011. Current account surpluses since 2007 hovered around $300 billion, and are expected to 
be above this level, despite the continued appreciation of yuan. If this trend continues, 
China’s losses will continue to mount.  
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Table 2.1: China’s Annual Profits from Currency Intervention, 1994-2011 
  
Exchange Rate  
($/RMB) 
Interest Rate 
(%) 
China FX 
($Billion) 
Annual Profit 
(Billion Yuan) 
1994 0.1160 4.64 52.9 6.0
1995 0.1198 5.56 75.4 32.2
1996 0.1203 5.08 107.0 42.9
1997 0.1206 5.18 142.8 59.3
1998 0.1208 4.83 149.2 59.7
1999 0.1208 4.75 146.2 57.5
2000 0.1208 5.90 165.6 80.9
2001 0.1208 3.34 212.2 58.7
2002 0.1208 1.68 286.4 39.8
2003 0.1208 1.05 403.3 35.1
2004 0.1208 1.58 609.9 29.3
2005 0.1220 3.39 818.9 39.4
2006 0.1254 4.81 1,066.3 2.1
2007 0.1314 4.44 1,528.2 -546.4
2008 0.1440 1.62 1,946.0 -6.2
2009 0.1464 0.28 2,399.2 -98.8
2010 0.1477 0.20 2,847.3 -843.0
2011 0.1548 0.10 3,181.1 -447.2
2012 0.1584     
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Table 2.2: China’s Annual Profits from Currency Intervention without Financial Flow 
  
Current 
Account  
($ Billion) 
Estimated FX  
($ Billion) 
Annual Profit 
(Billion Yuan) 
1994 7.7 7.7 0.9 
1995 1.6 9.6 4.1 
1996 7.2 17.4 7.0 
1997 37.0 55.3 23.0 
1998 31.5 89.6 35.8 
1999 21.1 115 45.2 
2000 20.5 141 68.9 
2001 17.4 166.7 46.1 
2002 35.4 207.7 28.9 
2003 45.9 257.1 22.3 
2004 68.7 328.5 15.8 
2005 134.1 467.7 22.5 
2006 232.7 716.3 1.4 
2007 354.0 1,104.8 -395.0 
2008 412.4 1,566.2 -5.0 
2009 261.1 1,852.7 -76.3 
2010 305.4 2,163.3 -640.5 
2011 201.7 2,369.3 -333.1 
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Table 2.3: China’s Cumulative Profits from Currency Intervention (billion yuan) 
  With Financial Inflow 
Without Financial 
Inflow 
1994 6.0 0.9 
1995 38.3 5.0 
1996 81.1 12.0 
1997 140.4 34.9 
1998 200.0 70.7 
1999 257.5 115.9 
2000 338.4 184.8 
2001 397.1 230.9 
2002 436.9 259.8 
2003 472.0 282.1 
2004 501.3 297.9 
2005 540.7 320.4 
2006 542.7 321.8 
2007 -3.7 -73.2 
2008 -9.9 -78.2 
2009 -108.7 -154.5 
2010 -951.6 -794.9 
2011 -1,398.8 -1,128.0 
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Figure 2.1: Exchange Rate and Balance of Payments Surplus 
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3.1 ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates whether China can benefit from a trade surplus (deficit) in one 
period and use it to pay off the debt in the next period by manipulating the exchange rates. If 
marginal utility of income is nonincreasing in the exchange rate, then the optimal exchange 
rates are the equilibrium rates that yields trade balance each period. Numerical examples 
using the Cobb-Douglas and CES utility functions illustrate the main proposition.  
3.2 INTRODUCTION 
Due to mounting currency reserves since the 1990s, China’s currency policy has been 
under intense scrutiny. People’s Bank of China (PBC) closed the currency swap market,14 
and began to regulate renminbi on January 1, 1994 by moving the official rate to the then 
prevailing swap market rates (Goldstein and Lardy 2009, page 6). According to State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange of PBC, China’s foreign exchange reserve, which 
excludes gold, was $22 billion in 1993.  
China’s foreign exchange reserve has since increased steadily, reaching $166 billion in 
2000. However, during the first decade of this century, China’s foreign exchange reserve rose 
dramatically to $3.3 trillion as of December 2011. Such a meteoric rise in China’s cumulative 
trade surplus has provoked much debate concerning China’s currency valuation and 
                                                            
14 Goldstein and Lardy (2009, pp. 5-6) noted that before 1994, the swap market was sanctioned by the Chinese 
government to settle trade transactions. It helped the Chinese government find the equilibrium exchange rate. 
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misalignment. The common view is that “China has intentionally depressed the value of its 
currency, the renminbi (RMB), to gain unfair advantages in the global market.” (Cheung, 
2011) 
Most major currencies are freely floating vis-à-vis other currencies, except renminbi.  
There might possibly be some gains from currency intervention in the foreign exchange 
market. For example, Gylfason and Schmid (1983) show that devaluation has positive output 
effects in a study of ten countries. Currency devaluation raises a country’s trade surplus 
temporarily. However, any foreign currency reserve so accumulated must eventually be used 
up, and sold at different exchange rate. 
Ghosh (1997) argued that a sharp trader can make profits in currency trading by utilizing 
the forward contracts on foreign currency. Ghosh and Arize (2003) suggested the present 
value concept to compute profits from speculation. However, Jin and Choi (2012) noted that 
while some profits might be generated by slightly deviating from the equilibrium exchange 
rates, but excessive hoarding of reserve assets can only result in huge losses. 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate optimal currency pegging to a single currency. 
Section 3.2 considers the effect of yuan appreciation on trade deficit. Section 3.3 investigates 
optimal currency pegging in a two-period framework. Section 3.4 compares stable exchange 
rates and yuan appreciation above the equilibrium rate for the case of Cobb-Douglas utility 
function, whereas Section 3.5 makes the same comparison for the CES utility function. 
Section 3.6 contains the concluding remarks. 
3.3 EXCHANGE RATE AND TRADE DEFICIT 
In this section we consider the effect of yuan appreciation on trade deficits and welfare to 
lay the basis for optimal currency pegging that maximize utility over two periods. 
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Effect of Yuan Appreciation on Trade Deficit 
Let the exportable good C be the numéraire, i.e., its yuan price 1b = , and let ε denote the 
dollar price of yuan. The dollar price *b ε=  of the exportable is equal to unity in the 
benchmark equilibrium.  Let P be the yuan price of the importable good Z. The foreign price 
of the importable good *P Pε=  is exogenous. Thus, the relative foreign price of the 
importable is * / ,P Pε =  equal to the relative domestic price of the importable since there is 
no tariff.  
Let x and q denote the physical volumes of exports and imports. The dollar value of 
imports is * ,qP qP Qε ε= =  where ( ) ( )Q q Pε ε= is the yuan value of imports. China’s trade 
deficit in dollars is written as: 
 ( ) * ( ) ( ),D g qP x Q Xε ε ε ε ε= = − = −  (44) 
where X xε=  is the dollar value of China’s exports.  
Differentiating (44) with respect to ε gives  
 ,D Q Q Xε ε εε= + −  (45) 
where subscripts denote partial derivatives.  
Let ( )/ ( / )X X Xεη ε ε≡ ∂ ∂ and ( )/ ( / )Q Q Qεη ε ε≡ − ∂ ∂  denote elasticity of exports and 
imports with respect to the exchange rate ε, respectively. Equation (5) can be rewritten as: 
 ( / ) ( / ) .X QD X Q Qε ε εη ε εη ε= − − +  (46) 
As yuan appreciates, China’s trade deficit is assumed to increase, i.e., 0.Dε >  When 
trade is balanced, ,X Qε=  and 
 1 .X QD Xε ε ε
ε η η= − −  
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Thus, China’s trade deficit in dollars increases as yuan appreciates if 
 1.X Qε εη η+ <  (47) 
Note that this is another way of expressing the Marshall-Lerner condition, which states 
that U.S. trade balance in dollars improves as yuan appreciates. It can be shown that China’s 
trade deficit in yuan also increases under the same condition.15 We assume that the above 
condition holds. This implies 0Dε >  and '( ) 0f D > . We further assume that China’s trade 
deficit increases at an increasing rate, "( ) 0f D < , as shown Figure 3.1.  
Production and Consumption 
Consider an open economy producing two goods over two periods. Let iC  and iZ  denote 
quantities of the exportable and importable that China produces in period i, 1,2i = . 
Production possibility frontier is given by ( )i iC F Z= . All resources are assumed to be fully 
employed, and an optimal output occurs on the frontier. Assume that there are no 
technological changes so that (.)F  is constant over time. Since the yuan price of the 
exportable C is unity, its dollar price is iε  in period i. Let *iP  be the dollar price of China’s 
importable good Z in period i.  
In each period, producers are assumed to maximize revenue in dollars from production, 
 * ,i i i i iR C P Zε= +  (48) 
                                                            
15 Let 
D Q x x
T Q
ε
ε ε ε
−= = = −  denote China’s trade deficit in yuan. Differentiating T with respect to ε yields 
 ( )2 2/ 1 / .x QT x x Q xε ε ε ε εε ε η η ε−= − + = − −  
Thus, a yuan appreciation increases China’s trade deficit in yuan if 1.x Qε εη η+ <  
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Maximum revenue requires *'( ) 0,i i iF Z Pε + = i.e., the dollar price of the importable is 
equal to its marginal cost, '( )i iF Zε− .  When trade is balanced, consumer expenditure 
exhausts revenue from production. When yuan appreciates above the equilibrium exchange 
rate, a trade deficit occurs. Thus, it is the consumers that are incurring trade deficits by 
consuming more than the economy produces. On the other hand, when a trade surplus is 
generated, consumers spend less by the amount of trade surplus. 
Consumer preferences are represented by a stationary utility function, ( , ),i iU c z where 
where ic  and iz  are China’s consumption of the exportable and importable, respectively. 
When trade is balanced, the budget constraint in dollars is given by:  
 * * .i i i i i i i ic P z C P Zε ε+ = +  (49) 
Let *i i i iD P q X= −  denote trade deficit in dollars in period i, where iX  is the value of 
exports, and iq  is the physical volume of imports. Consumer expenditure in dollars is 
* .i i i ic P zε +  When trade is balanced, 0iD = , and consumer expenditure is equal to producer 
revenue, iR .  When the country has a trade deficit ( 0iD > ), the total expenditure reduces to  
 * .i i i i i iR D c P zε+ = +  (50) 
If China incurs a trade deficit ( 0iD > ), its expenditure will be greater than if trade is 
balanced. 
Recall that the exportable is the numéraire and its yuan price is unity while its dollar price 
is ε. Yuan revenue from production is Y C PZ= + . Production revenue in dollars is 
*R C P Z Yε ε= + = . In the absence of trade barriers, maximizing revenue in dollars is 
44 
 
 
 
equivalent to maximizing revenue in yuan. From the budget constraint in (50), the total yuan 
expenditure in period i is given by 
 ( ) / ,i i i i i ic Pz R D ε+ = +  (51) 
The equilibrium condition for optimal consumption in each period is: 
 *
1 ,
i
c i
i
z i i
U
U P P
ε= =  i = 1, 2 
China’s consumer demands in period i are written as: *( , , ),i i i i ic c P R Dε= +  and 
*( , , ).i i i i iz z P R Dε= +  Since yuan appreciation has no effect on the dollar price of the 
importable good, we now suppress *iP .  
Consumer demands are now written as: ( , ),i i i ic c R Dε= +  and ( , ).i i i iz z R Dε= +   
Likewise, the indirect utility is written as: ( )( , ) ( , ), ( , ) .i i i i i i i i i iV R D U c R D z R Dε ε ε+ = + +  
3.4 OPTIMAL EXCHANGE RATES 
We consider a two-period model of currency intervention. Assume that no economic 
growth occurs over two periods, i.e., the production function ( )C F Z=  is stationary. In a 
stationary equilibrium, a country cannot accumulate a trade surplus or deficit indefinitely. 
Thus, if China incurs a current account deficit in the first period ( 0D > ), the principal plus 
interest is paid off in the next period. Alternatively, if it incurs a trade surplus in the first 
period, 0D < , and it is invested in the U.S. Any investment plus interest income so obtained 
is used up in the next period. We assume that the world economy is stable, and the price of 
the importable, P*, remains unaffected when China changes its peg to the dollar. This means 
that a yuan appreciation only affects the dollar price of China’s exports. Since the price of the 
importable is stable, * *1 2 *,P P P= =  and there is no tariff on imports, producer revenue in 
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dollars depends on the exchange rates. Specifically, 1 1 1 1* ,R C P Zε= +  and 
2 2 2 2* .R C P Zε= + See Figure 3.2. 
We now consider optimal exchange rates over two periods. In the benchmark scenario, 
the policy maker chooses stable exchange rates over the two periods, i.e., 1 2 1.
oε ε ε= = =  If 
China maintains stable exchange rates, trade will be balanced in both periods. Alternatively, 
the country may allow yuan to appreciate above unity in the first period, which yields a trade 
deficit. However, any trade deficit D must be borrowed from the U.S. and the debt grows to 
(1 )D r+ , which must be completely paid off in the second period. That is, a trade deficit in 
one period must be offset by a trade surplus in the next period. 
Two-Period Budget Constraint 
The relationship between trade deficit and the exchange rate is given by ( ).D g ε=  Any 
exchange rate below (above) unity results in a trade surplus in the first period. If 1 1ε = , then 
trade is balanced in the first period, 1 0,D =  which requires 2 0D = , and hence trade also 
must be balanced in the second period.  
We investigate whether China can benefit from a trade deficit or surplus in the first 
period. This means China pegs renminbi to the dollar above the equilibrium level ( 1 1
oε ε> = ) 
in the first period. However, the principal plus interest cost of any trade deficit so generated 
from this debt in period 1 must be completely paid off in period 2. Thus, a two-period budget 
constraint is given by  
 1 2(1 ) 0,D r D+ + =  (52) 
The slope of the budget constraint is: 
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 2
1
(1 ) 0.dD r
dD
= − + <  (53) 
Devaluation and Utility 
Next, we consider the effect of yuan appreciation on consumer welfare. We assume an 
additive two period-utility function, 
 2 21 1
( , )( , ) .
(1 )
U c zU c z
r
Φ ≡ + +  (54) 
The inverse trade deficit function ( )f Dε = is assumed to be monotonically increasing 
and concave. Let 1 1( )f Dε =  and 2 2( ).f Dε =  The total indirect utility over the two periods is 
given by   
 ( ) ( )2 2 21 2 1 1 1 ( ),( , ) ( ), 1
V f D R D
D D V f D R D
r
+Φ = + + +  (55) 
Let iD be the trade deficit and let i i iI R D= + denote the consumer expenditure in dollars 
in period i, where the subscripts denote time periods. The indirect utility in period 1 is written 
as: 
 
 [ ]1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1( , ) ( , ), ( , ) .V R D U c R D z R Dε ε ε+ = + +  (56) 
Similarly, the indirect utility in period 2 is: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2, , , , .V R D U c R D z R Dε ε ε+ = + +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  (57) 
Since (.)f  is a concave function, its inverse function ( )D ε  is a convex function. As yuan 
appreciates, China’s trade deficit increases at an increasing rate.  Thus, the total utility is: 
 ( ) ( )2 2 21 1 1 ,, .1
V R D
V R D
r
εε +Φ = + + +  (58) 
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Generating a trade deficit requires a yuan appreciation, which in turn affects producer 
revenue * .R C P Zε= +  Maximizing GDP in dollars for given P* requires ' * 0.F Pε + =  
From (49), we have 
 ( )*'( ) .i ii i i i
i i
dR dZC F Z P C
d dε ε= + + =  
Differentiating (15) with respect to 1D  and using Roy’s identity, IV cVε = − , we obtain 
 ( ) ( )1 11 1 1 1 1 1( ) '( ) 1 '( ) 1 .I IV c C f D V x f DΦ = − + + = +  
Likewise, 
 ( ) ( )2 22 2 2 2 2 2( ) '( ) 1 / (1 ) '( ) 1 / (1 ).I IV c C f D r V x f D rΦ = − + + + = + +  
The optimization problem is illustrated in Figure 3.3. The slope of the indifference curve 
is 
 ( )( )
1
1 1
2
2 2
'( ) 1
' (1 ) .
'( ) 1
I
I
V x f D
r
V x f D
+Φ = − + +  (59) 
The optimal solution occurs at a point where the indifference curve is tangent to the 
budget line, i.e., ( )( )
1
1 1
2
2 2
'( ) 1
1,
'( ) 1
I
I
V x f D
V x f D
+ =+ or 
 
1
2 2
2
1 1
'( ) 1.
'( ) 1
I
I
V x f D
V x f D
+= +  (60) 
We demonstrate that balanced trade is a solution to the maximization problem. When 
1 2 1ε ε= = , in equation (59), 1 2x x= , 1 2 0D D= = , and 1 2'( ) '( ) '(0)f D f D f= = . Moreover, 
producer revenues are equalized, 1 2R R= , and hence 1 21 2(1, ) (1, )I IV R V R= . Thus, 
' (1 )rΦ = − + , which implies that the indifference curve is tangent to the budget constraint.  
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Note that along the 45 degree line, 1 2D D= , 1 2 ox x x= = and 
1 1 2 2'( ) '( ) '(0)
ox f D x f D x f= = . Thus, marginal utility of income is equalized between the two 
periods, 1 2I IV V=  if, and only if 1 2D D=  along the 45 degree line. This path is analogous to 
the expansion path in consumer demand theory. The intersection of the 45 degree line and the 
budget constraint yields the optimal solution.  
Next, consider the slope of the indifference curve below the 45 degree line in Figure 3.3 
where 1 20D D> > . What is the effect of yuan appreciation on the marginal utility of income? 
A yuan appreciation enables the Chinese consumer to buy more foreign goods and hence he 
experiences an increase in real income. We assume that marginal utility of income is 
nonincreasing in the exchange rate.16 
Below the 45 degree line, 1 2I IV V<  and the LHS of (60) is less than or equal to unity. Note 
that 1 20D D> >  implies 1 2ox x x< < . Since ( )f D  is concave in D, 1 2'( ) '(0) '( ).f D f f D< <  
Thus, below the 45 degree line ( 1 20D D> > ), the right hand side (RHS) of (60) is greater 
than unity, 
 2 2
1 1
'( ) 1 1.
'( ) 1
x f D
x f D
+ >+  
Hence, we have 
                                                            
16 Note that using Roy’s identity, we have ( ) / 0.I I I I I IIV V cV I c V cVε ε= = ∂ − ∂ = − − ≤  This implies that 
( / )( / ) / .II Ic I I c IV V∂ ∂ ≥ −  The right hand side is often called the relative risk aversion, whereas the left hand 
side is the income elasticity of demand for the exportable good. In typical trade models, income elasticity of 
demand is assumed to be unity. Thus, the assumption that yuan appreciation does not lower the marginal utility 
of income means relative risk aversion is less than unity. If marginal utility of income is constant, relative risk 
aversion is unity. 
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 ( )( )
1
1 1
1 22
2 2
'( ) 1
1,    for 
'( ) 1
I
I
V x f D
D D
V x f D
+ < >+  
which implies in (59), ' (1 ).rΦ > − +  That is, below the 45 degree line ( 1 20D D> > ), the 
indifference curve is flatter than the budget constraint.  
Above the 45 degree line, 1 20D D< <  implies 1 2ox x x> > . Since ( )f D  is concave in D, 
1 2'( ) '(0) '( ).f D f f D> >  Thus, above the 45 degree line ( 1 20D D< < ), the right hand side 
(RHS) of (60) is less than unity, 
 2 2
1 1
'( ) 1 1.
'( ) 1
x f D
x f D
+ <+  
Moreover, 1 2I IV V>  and the LHS of (60) is greater than unity. Thus, 
 ( )( )
1
1 1
2 12
2 2
'( ) 1
1,    for .
'( ) 1
I
I
V x f D
D D
V x f D
+ > >+  
That is, if 1 0D < , then in (59), ' (1 )rΦ < − + , and the indifference curve is steeper than 
the budget constraint. Thus, the solution 1 2 0D D= =  maximizes consumer welfare, and  
balanced trade is the optimal solution. 
Proposition 1: Assume that (i) the policy maker maximizes consumer welfare over two 
periods, and (ii) yuan appreciation does not increase marginal utility of income. Then the 
equilibrium exchange rate that yields trade balance each period maximizes the total utility 
over two periods, regardless of the interest rate. 
3.5 THE CASE OF COBB-DOUGLAS UTILITY FUNCTION 
In this section, we construct a Cobb-Douglas utility function which illustrates Proposition 
1 that optimal intervention is nonintervention, i.e., the optimal exchange rate is that which 
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yields balanced trade each period.  Assume that interest rate is 0.05r = . A two-period Cobb-
Douglas utility function is  
 
.5 .5
.5 .52 2 2 2
1 1 1 1
( , )( , ) ,
1 1 .05
U c z c zU c z c z
r
+ = ++ +  (61) 
Consider a production possibility function given by: 
 2 24 100.C Z+ =  (62) 
Recall that trade is balanced when ε = 1. We assume the dollar price of the importable be 
* 1P = . Since 2( ) 100 4 ,C Z Zφ= = − we have 4'( ) * / .ZZ P
C
φ ε= − = −  This implies 
4 ,C Zε= and 2 2 2 2(4 ) 4 (16 4) 100Z Z Zε ε+ = + = . Thus, 
2 2
10 5 .
16 4 1 4
Z ε ε= =+ +  and 
2
20 .
1 4
C εε= +  
Balanced Trade 
First, consider the case where trade is balanced, i.e., 1oε = . Then 5oZ =  and 
4 5.oC =  Equilibrium condition requires 
 1
2
1 1,
*
U z
U c P
= = =  
and .c z=  Maximized income under balanced trade is 5 5.o o o oI R C Z= = + =  
Consumption under balanced is: 2.5 5.o oc z= =  Trade deficit is 
( ) (2.5 5 5) (4 5 2.5 5) 0,o o o oD z Z C c= − − − = − − − =  as expected. The utility under 
balanced trade is .5( ) 2.5 5 5.59,o o oU c z= = ≈  and the total utility over two periods is 
approximately 10.91, as shown in Table 3.1. 
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Consumer Equilibrium with Trade Deficit 
The equilibrium condition for optimal consumption is: .
*
z
c P
ε ε= =  Thus, .c zε =  
Budget constraint is: * 2 .c P z c z c Iε ε ε+ = + = =  Equilibrium demands for good 
are: ,  
2 2
I Ic zε= = . Indirect utility is given by  
 
.52 .5
4 2
I IV εε
−⎛ ⎞= =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
. (63) 
Thus, .5.5 ,IV ε −=  and 
 1.5(1/ 4) 0.IV ε ε −= − <  (64) 
Recall that when ε = 1, income or expenditure is 5 5.  When China pegs yuan below this 
equilibrium value, its expenditure falls below the income level under balanced trade, 5 5.   
Let the trade deficit function be given by 
 5 5( 1),D ε= −  (65) 
where income under balanced trade is 5 5.I =  Trade surplus is zero when 1oε = .  
If ε rises above the equilibrium level, then a trade deficit occurs. For example, if ε rises 
20 percent above 1, then the resulting trade deficit is also 20 percent of the income under 
balanced trade, i.e., 5 5( 1) 2.24.D ε= − =  Utility in the first period is 1 6.95.U =  A 20 
percent appreciation of yuan above unity in period 1 necessitates an approximately 21 
percent devaluation of yuan below unity in the second period. Utility with a trade surplus in 
the second period falls to 2 3.94U = . The discounted value of utility in the second period is 
2 / (1 ) 3.76.U r+ =  The total utility over the two periods is roughly 21 10.708.1.05
UUΦ = + =   
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Alternatively, if a 20 percent devaluation in the first period is followed by a 21 percent 
revaluation above unity, then total utility is 10.705, which is even worse than the policy of a 
trade deficit in the first period followed by a trade surplus in the second period.  Thus, the 
reverse policy of overvaluation in the first period and undervaluation in the second period 
does not improve the overall welfare either. If the interest rate were zero, the reverse policy 
would yield the same level of utility. But due to the positive interest rate, the reverse policy 
yields an even lower utility than the policy of devaluation in the first period and revaluation 
in the second. 
When the stable exchange 1oε =  is chosen for both periods, 1 25.59 .U U= =  The total 
utility over two periods is 21 10.91.1.05
UU + =  Thus, this example shows that the policy of 
yuan appreciation in one period and devaluation in the other yields less utility than if stable 
exchange rates were maintained over the two periods.  
3.6 THE CASE OF CES UTILITY FUNCTION 
A constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function is given by 
 ( )1/(1 ) ,U c z ρρ ρα α= − +   
where 1 1/ρ σ= −  and σ is the elasticity of substitution. Demand functions are given by:  
 
1
1
(1 ) ,
(1 )
.
(1 )
Ic
Iz
σ σ
σ σ σ
σ
σ σ σ
α ε
α α ε
α
α α ε
−
−
−
−= + −
= + −
  
Thus, the indirect utility function is 
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 ( )1/( 1)1(1 ) .V Iσσ σ σα ε α −−= − +   (66) 
It follows that 
 
( )
( )
1/( 1)1
(2 )/( 1)1
(1 ) .
(1 ) (1 ) 0.
I
I
V
V
σσ σ σ
σ σσ σ σ σ σ
ε
α ε α
α ε α α ε
−−
− −− −
= − +
= − − + − <
  
Using the same production possibility function, 2 24 100,C Z+ = as before, the outputs are:  
2 2
10 5
16 4 1 4
Z ε ε= =+ +  and 2
20 .
1 4
C εε= +  
Recall that income under balanced trade is 5 5.I =  If ε rises 20 percent above 1, then 
the resulting trade deficit is also 20 percent of the income under balanced trade, i.e., 
5 5( 1) 2.24.D ε= − =  Utility in the first period is 1 7.26.U =  A 20 percent appreciation of 
yuan above unity in period 1 necessitates an approximately 21 percent devaluation of yuan 
below unity in the second period. Utility with a trade surplus in the second period falls to 
2 4.34U = . The discounted value of utility in the second period is 2 / (1 ) 4.14U r+ =  The total 
utility over the two periods is roughly 21 11.396.1.05
UUΦ = + =  See Table 3.2. 
Alternatively, if a 20 percent devaluation in the first period is followed by a 21 percent 
revaluation above unity, then total utility is 11.399, which is slightly above that under the 
policy of a trade deficit in the first period followed by a trade surplus in the second period.  
Thus, the reverse policy of overvaluation in the first period and undervaluation in the second 
period does not improve the overall welfare either.  
When the stable exchange 1oε =  is chosen for both periods, 1 25.99 .U U= =  The total 
utility over two periods is 21 11.698.1.05
UU + =  Thus, this example shows that the policy of 
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yuan appreciation in one period and devaluation in the other yields less utility than if stable 
exchange rates were maintained over the two periods. 
3.7 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
China has been criticized for maintaining a large amount of foreign exchange reserve to 
take unfair advantage of its trading partners. This paper investigated whether a country can 
benefit from generating a trade deficit or surplus by arbitrarily changing the yuan-dollar peg. 
In a two-period framework, if a country incurs a trade deficit in one period, the principal plus 
interest must be paid off subsequently.  Alternatively, if a country accumulates a trade 
surplus, the investment plus interest income must be spent in the next period. It is shown that 
under reasonable condition on marginal utility of income, the optimal exchange rate is the 
equilibrium rate that yields trade balance over both periods.  
The analysis is easily extended to the multiperiod framework. Any accumulation of trade 
surplus or deficit must be eventually offset by opposing deficit or surplus in the terminal 
period. Such deviation of exchange rates from the balanced trade always yields uneven 
utilities and marginal utilities of income, which contribute to lower consumer welfare, 
provided that indirect utility is concave in expenditure. Therefore, there are no gains from 
deviating from the equilibrium exchange rates. 
China’s acquisition of a large foreign exchange reserve suggests that the current 
exchange rate policy may be harmful to consumer welfare, contrary to the prevailing view 
that China pursues its self-interest by taking unfair advantage in the global market. 
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Table 3.1: Exchange Rates and C-D Utility, 1/2 1/2* 1, .P U c z= =  
1ε  0.8000 0.9000 1.0000 1.1000 1.2000 
1D  -2.2361 -1.1180 0.0000 1.1180 2.2361 
1C  8.4800 8.7416 8.9443 9.1037 9.2308 
1Z  2.6500 2.4282 2.2361 2.0690 1.9231 
1R  9.4340 10.2956 11.1803 12.0830 13.0000 
1I  7.1979 9.1776 11.1803 13.2011 15.2361 
1c  4.4987 5.0987 5.5902 6.0005 6.3484 
1z  3.5990 4.5888 5.5902 6.6005 7.6180 
1U  4.0238 4.8370 5.5902 6.2934 6.9543 
r   0.0500 0.0500 0.0500 0.0500 0.0500 
2D  2.3479 1.1739 0.0000 -1.1739 -2.3479 
2ε  1.2100 1.1050 1.0000 0.8950 0.7900 
2C  9.2420 9.1107 8.9443 8.7300 8.4498 
2Z  1.9095 2.0612 2.2361 2.4386 2.6740 
2R  13.0924 12.1286 11.1803 10.2520 9.3493 
2I  15.4402 13.3025 11.1803 9.0780 7.0015 
2c  6.3803 6.0192 5.5902 5.0715 4.4313 
2z  7.7201 6.6513 5.5902 4.5390 3.5007 
2U  7.0183 6.3274 5.5902 4.7979 3.9386 
Φ  10.7078 10.8631 10.9141 10.8628 10.7054 
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Table 3.2: Exchange Rates and CES Utility, * 1, .25, .5.P α σ= = =  
1ε  0.8000 0.9000 1.0000 1.1000 1.2000 
1D  -2.2361 -1.1180 0.0000 1.1180 2.2361 
1C  8.4800 8.7416 8.9443 9.1037 9.2308 
1Z  2.6500 2.4282 2.2361 2.0690 1.9231 
1R  9.4340 10.2956 11.1803 12.0830 13.0000 
1I  7.1979 9.1776 11.1803 13.2011 15.2361 
1c  5.4679 6.3393 7.0881 7.7402 8.3146 
1z  2.8236 3.4722 4.0923 4.6869 5.2586 
1U  4.4306 5.2546 5.9915 6.6561 7.2598 
r   0.0500 0.0500 0.0500 0.0500 0.0500 
2D  2.3479 1.1739 0.0000 -1.1739 -2.3479 
2ε  1.2100 1.1050 1.0000 0.8950 0.7900 
2C  9.2420 9.1107 8.9443 8.7300 8.4498 
2Z  1.9095 2.0612 2.2361 2.4386 2.6740 
2R  13.0924 12.1286 11.1803 10.2520 9.3493 
2I  15.4402 13.3025 11.1803 9.0780 7.0015 
2c  8.3683 7.7706 7.0881 6.2989 5.3727 
2z  5.3146 4.7160 4.0923 3.4405 2.7570 
2U  7.3172 6.6877 5.9915 5.2156 4.3427 
Φ  11.3993 11.6238 11.6977 11.6234 11.3957 
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Figure 3.1: Exchange Rate and Trade Surplus 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Yuan Appreciation and Revenue in Dollars 
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Figure 3.3: Maximizing Consumer Welfare subject to a Two-Period Budget Constraint 
 
 
